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PENSIONS AUTO-ENROLMENT: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES 
AMANDA WYPER *1 
A. INTRODUCTION 
B. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
(1) When do Fiduciary Obligations Exist Generally? 
(a) Status 
(b) Contractual Undertaking 
(2) Consequences of Fiduciary Obligations 
C. EMPLOYER AS AN AGENT 
(1) The Agency Relationship 
(2) Consequences of Agency 
D. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
(1) Implied Terms 
(a) Mutual Trust and Confidence 
(b) Good Faith 
(c) Duty to Advise 
(d) Duty to Avoid Economic Loss 
(2) AE Compliance 




The introduction of auto-enrolment (AE) into workplace pensions in 20122 requires employers to 
enrol workers into a pension. Employers have significant discretion in this process and rely on the 
financial services industry to ensure compliance with AE minimum standards. Employers may not 
always have pension expertise and will engage pension providers for advice on establishing compliant 
pension arrangements or modifying existing schemes to use for AE. Whilst this policy benefits many, 
my empirical research3 has identified a number of negative consequences flowing from the 
                                                            
1 *Amanda Wyper is a teaching fellow in Banking Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh and solicitor 
(non-practicing) Scotland.     
2 Pensions Act (PA) 2007 C22, PA 2008 C30 
3 A Wyper “The Social Costs of Auto-Enrolment in Workplace Pensions and Possible Remedies” 
(2016)(Unpublished PhD Thesis, On File with Edinburgh University Library) 
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introduction of AE. For example, employers choosing poorly performing schemes, insufficient 
protection of free choice and poor default positions replacing active decision making, all of which 
result in poor value for some employees.  The parties’ interests may not always be aligned.  Despite 
the minimum criteria, there can be significant variations between fund costs and scheme quality as 
private sector pensions are frequently used for compliance. Whilst the ability of employees to opt-out 
provides legitimacy for the regime, the form of implementation and use of defaults erodes the exercise 
of choice and there are no provisions to encourage engagement and active decision-making by 
individuals. In addition to this, inadequate advice impacts on the effects of AE for many. For some 
this means that they pay in less overall than they would have if they had voluntarily chosen to 
contribute to a plan.4  
This paper explores whether further statutory change to the AE regime is required or whether existing 
private law remedies, with a focus on Scots law, afford sufficient remedy for those suffering loss. If 
fiduciary, agency, contractual or delictual obligations arise from the AE relationship then this may 
provide adequate remedy. This paper will consider whether fiduciary duties are owed to employees, 
particularly by the employer (as an agent) to the employee, and the extent of duties owed under the 
contract of employment.  
B. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
Employers may owe fiduciary duties to the employee in respect of the method of implementing its 
employer AE obligations, in a similar way to the duties owed to scheme members by occupational 
pension scheme trustees.5 However, the position in relation to contract based schemes, such as group 
personal pensions often used for AE, has always been governed by contract. In a personal pension 
policy the contract is agreed between the individual and the pension provider on the provider’s terms. 
With AE, there has been a blurring of the lines where the employer chooses a provider, the contractual 
terms, enrols the employee into the arrangement and then deducts contributions from salary. The 
employee may change the investment, contribution amount or choose to leave but cannot vary the 
contractual agreement other than by leaving the plan. The product provider generally writes the 
contract terms as “take it or leave it contracts.”6 My question here is whether fiduciary duties are 
                                                            
4 Bubb & Pildes “ How Behavioural Economics Trims its sails and why” (2014) 127(6) Harv L Rev 1593-1678 at 
1618, Choi et al  “Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance” available at 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/bmadria/Documents/Madrian%20Papers/Saving%20for%20Retirement%20o
n%20the%20Path%20of%20Least%20Resistance.pdf (2001 updated 2004) 
Madrian & Shea “The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behaviour” (2001) The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4) 1149-1187 at 263, C Sunstein “Empirically Informed Regulation” (2011) 
78 U Chi Law Rev 1349-1429 
 
5 Arising under trust law and from PA 1995 C26 & PA 2004 C35 
6 The Law Commission “Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries” June 2014 Law Com No 350 at 8.6 
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owed by employers, product providers or advisors to the employees in the AE compliance process, 
almost as de facto investment intermediaries as envisaged by the recent Kay review.7 Fiduciary duties 
may arise from the nature and obligations of the AE relationship, particularly under agency which 
creates both fiduciary and non-fiduciary obligations.    
(1) When do Fiduciary Obligations Exist Generally? 
Fiduciary duties and the circumstances in which they arise can be difficult to identify.8 The “trustee” 
must promote the interests of the beneficiaries, avoid conflicts of interest and not profit from the trust. 
Any consideration of fiduciary duties needs to identify to whom the duties are owed, what the duties 
are and in what respect the breach occurred9 and there are dangers of extending law by analogy.10 In 
establishing the fiduciary relationship one party is always dominant and another subordinate.11  
Vulnerability and reliance in contract may justify supervision of the relationship, but not imposition of 
the requirement of one party to act loyally in the other’s interests. 12  The employee is particularly 
vulnerable in AE as he has no right to contribute to the process of choosing a pension product or 
provider. Asymmetries of power have created an “emerging trend to insist upon disclosure”13 but this 
may not justify exacting loyalty from one party to the other in the relationship.14  
The exercise of power by one party over the other or exercise of discretion or judgement might also 
define the fiduciary relationship.15 16 In AE the employer has complete discretion in respect of product 
provider and benefits. The issues of trust, confidence, power, inequality and dependency demonstrate 
the roles of the parties in the relationship. However, there are many instances of inequality in 
contractual dealing which do not equate to fiduciary obligations as one party has not relaxed self-
vigilance.17 Financial advisors are one of the recognised categories of fiduciary agents18 but this is 
because the financial advisor voluntarily assumes the obligation. In the employment relationship, the 
employee relies on and trusts the employer to act in his best interests when dealing with his pension. 
Information asymmetries may then lead to the conclusion that the employer owes fiduciary duties to 
                                                            
7 (2014) Law Com n6, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making: Final Report 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253454/bis-12-
917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf at 65-67 
8 P Birks “The Content of Fiduciary Obligation” (2000) 34(1) Isr Law Rev 3-38 at 8 
9 SEC v Chenery Corporation (1943) 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 
10 Birks n8 at 35 
11 P Miller “The Fiduciary Relationship” in Gold & Miller Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (2014) at 1 
& 73, J Murray “Conceptualizing the Employer as Fiduciary: Mission Impossible?” in Bogg  et al The Autonomy 
of Labour Law (2015) at 353 
12 P Finn “Contract and the Fiduciary Principle” (1989) 12 UNSWLJ 76-97 at 94 
13 Finn n 12 at 78 
14 Finn n 12 at 83 
15 P Miller “A Theory of Fiduciary Liability”  2011 Vol 56 McGill L J 235 at 262 
16 L Smith “Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?” in Gold n11 at 158 
17 Finn n 12 at 94 
18 J Edelman “The Role of Status in the Law of Obligations” in Gold n11 at 38 
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the employee in this respect. Such duties might then be qualified or limited by information provided 
to the employee by the employer. Control of the assets of the other party may also be an indicator of 
fiduciary status and this may arise in a wide range of business contexts, including contractual 
relationships, which may specify differing terms. Then “a question arises about the way in which 
fiduciary obligations may be imposed alongside the obligations spelled out in the contract.19”   
(a) Status  
Fiduciary duties are often presumed where a particular relationship or status exists20 and the law now 
includes many relationships; which can make identification of a fiduciary relationship difficult and 
heavily dependent on the given facts. 21 Some question the approach of using status to define 
obligations,22 arguing instead that the undertakings of the particular matter are key. Others argue that 
this contractual approach is incorrect with fiduciary obligation sometimes operating in “opposition to 
intention.23” The status of the parties in any case will provide evidence of the nature of 
undertakings.24   
The question of whether the pension product provider or the employer’s financial advisors owe any 
fiduciary obligations to the employee also arises. This could be in the act of providing information to 
employees or otherwise dealing with pre or post contract issues. For AE, contractual terms are 
generally agreed between the employer and the provider/advisors and this might lead to an 
expectation of fiduciary duties owed by the advisor to the employer. Contractual provisions may seek 
to specifically exclude this and it will depend on the nature of the relationship. If the advisor or 
provider deals with employees this may also constitute a fiduciary relationship.  It is sometimes 
assumed that all those acting in an advisory capacity are fiduciaries of their clients25 but it is not clear 
what the position is in relation to putative clients (the employees) in the AE situation. There are 
dangers in relying on status for implication of terms because the same status can describe many 
different types of relationship 26 and some tasks within the relationship may not be fiduciary. 27 For 
example, a financial advisor undertakes to provide advice and will be considered a fiduciary but a tied 
advisor may not be where he provides only information and not advice. The nature of undertakings, 
here the provision of advice, taken with the status forms evidence of the extent of the fiduciary 
obligations. In addition to the giving of advice, it is suggested that there must be an element of 
discretion being exercised to establish that the advisor is a fiduciary. A financial firm may owe 
                                                            
19 F & C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy and another (No 2) [2011] EWHC 1731 (CH) at 650 
20 J Edelman n18 at 30 
21 J Edelman “When do fiduciary duties arise?” 2010 L Q R 126(April) 302-327 at 305 
22 Gold n11 at 3 
23 D DeMott “Beyond Metaphor: An analysis of fiduciary obligation” 1988 Duke L.J 879-924 at 887 
24 J Edelman n18 at 34 
25 P Miller n11 at 83 
26 J Edelman n18 at 37 
27 P Miller n11 at 83, Hodgkinson v Simms [1994] 3 SCR 377 
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fiduciary duties where the firm moves beyond “mere salesman.28” It is clear from my empirical 
study29 that there are misunderstandings about the role of product providers and advisors and whether 
information or advice is provided. Consequently, both employers and employees may be able to 
demonstrate that the provider of information was relied on and trusted as an advisor undertaking 
fiduciary responsibilities as advisor rather than merely acting as a salesman.  
The employment relationship can give rise to fiduciary duties30 but this does not mean that the 
relationship is fiduciary in nature. 31 32 Increasing examples of senior managers owing the employer 
fiduciary obligations33 might lead to the conclusion that the employer could also owe fiduciary 
obligations to the employee in some circumstances. However, the operation of the employment law 
relationship where the parties do not subjugate their own interests to the other may prevent such a 
finding 34 and it is unlikely that the entire relationship is fiduciary in nature. The most important 
component is the relationship of trust and confidence, with loyalty a key duty.35 Whilst mere 
employment does not create fiduciary obligations, the duties can exist where they arise from particular 
contractual obligations and within the constraints of the contractual relationship.36 Facts may disclose 
fiduciary obligations within the employment relationship on an ad hoc basis.37A fiduciary may not be 
a fiduciary for all purposes. This would allow a finding that the employer is a fiduciary in respect of 
choosing the AE scheme but not in other respects. 38  
The asymmetry in information and power in the employment relationship demonstrates the 
employee’s vulnerability which might indicate fiduciary obligations are owed to the employee.39 
However the mutuality in the relationship means the employer is entitled to have regard to its own 
interests rather than simply considering those of the employee and this mutuality is different to the 
fiduciary relationship.40 There are aspects of financial control in deductions of pension contributions 
but these are often not specified in the contract of employment. The holding of assets in this way may 
characterise this part of the relationship as fiduciary by agency, discussed further below. 
                                                            
28 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No5) [2012] FCA 1200 [2324] 
29 A. Wyper n3  
30 Reading v Attorney General UKHL 1 [1951] AC 507, Stoelwinder v Southern Health [2001] FCA 115 at 39, 
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation 1984 156 CLR 41 
31 University of Nottingham v Fishel, (2000) EWHC 221 (QB), IRLR 471, Samsung Semiconductor Europe v 
Docherty, (2011) CSOH, 32, 2011 SLT 806 
32 D Brodie “The Employment Relationship and Fiduciary Obligations” (2012) Edin L R 16(2) 198-209 at 200  
33 Anderson Smyth and Kelly Customs Brokers v World Wide Customs Brokers 1996 7 WWR 736, Collidge v 
Freeport [2007] EWHC 1216 (QB) 
34 D Brodie n32 at 208 
35 V Sims “Is Employment a Fiduciary Relationship?” (2001) 30  I L J  101-110 at 102 
36 University of Nottingham v Fishel, (2000) EWHC 221 (QB), IRLR 471 
37 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1996] EWCA Civ 1292 
38 Beach Petroleum v Kennedy 1999 48 NSWLR 1, 188 
39 D Brodie (2012) n32 at 209  
40 V Sims n35 at 103 
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(b) Contractual Undertaking 
Rather than considering status as the key factor, the alternative approach is to consider the nature and 
extent of undertakings although case law often establishes the relationship first.41 The contract will 
provide the “contextual framework in which the question [which fiduciary obligations apply in the 
context] arises”42.  The contractual relationship in this way moulds the fiduciary obligations43 like 
implied terms construed in return for other voluntary undertakings.  The key is whether there has been 
a voluntary assumption of responsibility44 for some matter. Fiduciary duties, where they arise, are like 
supporting duties, protecting non-fiduciary duties,45 likened to “legal polyfilla46” which can be 
moulded to fill gaps but are not the whole structure.  In other words, fiduciary obligations are there to 
ensure proper performance of contractual obligations.  
Single-minded loyalty47 might be the key defining indicator of fiduciary duties. From loyalty follows 
the duties to: act in good faith; not profit from the trust; not expose himself to conflict of interest and 
not act in such circumstances without the informed consent of the principal.48 It has been argued that 
it is the particular way that the fiduciary exercises judgement which encapsulates the duty.49 Smith’s 
argument about judgement is very persuasive for AE, where the employer exercises judgement and 
discretion when choosing and designing a pension to invest the employees’ contributions. It is the 
position of power, held by the employer, which may limit the effect of contractual exclusions. The 
fiduciary duties are imposed because of the social and economic power wielded by employers.50 A 
key element of this is the deduction of employee contributions from salary which the employer is then 
entrusted to invest on behalf of the employee. In holding the employees’ assets and using discretion 
and judgement to invest them it is difficult to imagine that the employer does not owe a duty of some 
kind but whether this is fiduciary in nature is unclear because of competing employer interests.  
If the undertakings were contractually agreed, without the imposition of AE, it would seem to be a 
voluntary fiduciary undertaking but the fact that the undertakings are imposed by the AE legislation 
rather than voluntarily assumed may prevent such a finding.  
(2) Consequences of Fiduciary Obligations 
                                                            
41 J Edelman (2010) n21 at 311 
42 F & C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy and another (No 2) [2011] EWHC 1731 (CH) at 
650, Hospital Products n30 at 97 
43 Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood [2005] 1 WLR 567 
44 Edelman n21 at 309 
45 M Conaglen “The nature and function of fiduciary loyalty” (2005) 121 LQR 452-480 at 471 
46 Law Com (2014) n6 at 1.20 
47 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew (1988) CH 1 at 18 
48 A Gold “The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law” in Gold n11 176-194  
49 L Smith “Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?” in Gold n11 141-158 at 151 
50 S Freeman “Women at Work: The Broken Promise of Flexicurity” (2004) 33(4) ILJ 299 at 301 
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The duty to act in the best interests of beneficiaries can be vague and it can be unclear from 
contractual or other evidence of the undertakings as to what is expected by the parties.51 The 
performance of obligations in good faith also depends on circumstances.52 Whilst it is possible that 
the employer or its advisors may owe fiduciary like duties to the employees, in respect of choice of 
AE scheme and provision of information, this does not make them fiduciaries in law. Many of the 
indicators of a fiduciary relationship are in evidence in the AE situation but it is uncertain whether the 
courts would find that employers owe a general fiduciary obligation to employees in complying with 
AE. Even if this was to be established it is unclear what this duty would require. Providers or advisors 
may also owe fiduciary obligations if they have undertaken the role of advisor to the employee as well 
as to the employer.  
C. EMPLOYER AS AN AGENT 
Even if there is no general fiduciary relationship, it can be argued that in taking charge of arranging 
the pension contract, choosing provider, deducting contributions from the employee’s salary and 
making decisions about when to change providers or schemes in future, the employer acts as an agent 
of the employee. The power of the agent (employer) in this instance, is to enter into and act under a 
legally valid contract on behalf of the principal (employee). 53 
Where employers use a trust based scheme for AE, the employer does not contract with a provider on 
behalf of the employee but facilitates admission to a scheme and the employee can deal directly with 
the scheme administrator. The scheme trustees will then owe fiduciary duties to scheme members. 
However, where a personal pension arrangement is used, the employer contracts on behalf of the 
employee to take out the personal pension contract but will also contract with the provider separately 
in relation to the plan administration. The product provider or financial advisor may act as the 
employer’s agent in providing information and assistance to employees on its behalf, although 
standard contractual terms with the provider may exclude agency obligations in this context.  
The contract of employment is will usually make reference to pension and AE in general terms to 
maintain flexibility but agency may arise without formal contractual terms. Facts and circumstances 
may be averred to prove the existence of the agency relationship.54 In Scotland, agency can be 
demonstrated without a written agreement if it can be shown who the parties are, where and when the 
contract was entered and the terms of the contract. 55 In England there is no requirement for a contract 
                                                            
51 Nicholls “Trustees and Their Broader Community: Where Duty, Morality and Ethics Converge” (1995) 9(3) TLI 
71-77 at 74, Edelman n21 at 323-324 
52 F&C Investments n42 at 655, Conaglen n45 at 463 
53 P Miller n11 at 79 
54 L Macgregor “Defining Agency and its scope” in DiMatteo et al Transatlantic Perspectives on Commercial 
Contract Law (2015) at 4 
55 Rodewald v Taylor [2010] CSOH 5 para 33,  L Macgregor The Law of Agency in Scotland (2013) at 35 
8 
 
to establish agency and so the facts must establish that one party consented to the exercise of authority 
to act. 56 This distinction between Scottish and English law may result in different consequences and 
remedies being available in Scotland as a consequence of the implementation of UK wide Pensions 
legislation. The issue of consent is key in English cases, which do not require a contract and the 
difficulties of proof of contract arise in Scotland. 
(1) The Agency Relationship 
The generic terms in the contract of employment regarding pensions and lack of contractual 
instruction by the principal (employee) are not fatal to a finding of agency, by consent or under 
contract, as the employer is responsible for implementing AE under statute and contracting on behalf 
of the employee in the context of the employment law contract. Even where there are instructions in 
recognised agency situations, these are often incomplete.57 In Scotland, non-consensual agency might 
be established where the power ceded to the agent is sufficient to establish the relationship, like 
implied terms in the contract. The creation involves “the grant of legal powers to the so-called agent, 
and the creation of correlative liabilities in the principal.58” However, more recent emphasis on the 
contractual nature of agency in Scotland means that consent is more likely to be inferred to create the 
contract rather than saying it is a non-consensual contract of agency59.  Rather than creating a general 
agency it can be argued that the employee cedes power to the employer for AE to contract with 
pension providers on his behalf and that the employer has control of the employee’s assets 
(deductions from salary as contributions). This ceding of power is evidence of tacit consent to the 
contractual agency relationship and may be used in Scotland to imply the terms of agency to the 
transaction. However, the nature of AE being imposed by statute may go against a finding of 
consensual agency. 
The employee may be said to have granted authority to the employer to contract with any pension 
provider it chooses although, with AE, the employee is simply advised of AE and he has no right to 
opt-out until after the contract is concluded. The employee has no say in the choice of provider and 
the employer’s unfettered power may go against a finding of agency.60  However, if we consider other 
examples of agency, such as the lawyer acting as agent for the client, many decisions will be made 
without the client’s express consent and the client may lack knowledge to properly supervise the 
actions of the agent. The employer is not completely controlled by the principal’s wishes and must 
also follow other rules and requirements. Agents are still subject to legal limits of what may be 
                                                            
56 Watts & Reynolds Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (2010) 1-1001, L Macgregor (2013) n55 at 17  
57 D DeMott “The Fiduciary Character of Agency” in Gold n11 at 323 
58 Hohfield “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale LJ  16-59 at 
46 
59 Arising like an implied term in the contract.  L Macgregor n55 at 2-21 
60 D DeMott “Defining Agency and Its scope” in DiMatteo et al Comparative Commercial Contract Law: A tale 
of Two Legal Systems (2015) 
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undertaken on behalf of the principal and for AE the employee cannot ask the employer not to auto-
enrol him as this is required externally by operation of the AE legislation. The characterisation of the 
relationship by the parties themselves is also significant but not determinative.61  
The employer is unlikely to be a general agent for the employee in all matters but a specific AE 
agency might be implied in respect of the specific purpose of choosing a pension scheme for AE 
where there is evidence to support the inference. 62 Implication will depend on the indicators or 
reliance and undertaking of responsibilities 63 and whether trust and confidence is reposed.64 This may 
be important for employees who rely on the relationship with the employer to ensure the best 
decisions are made. If there is an implied agency in the specific role of the employer selecting a 
pension scheme for AE this may increase the communication requirements requiring employers to 
give employees more specific information and warnings. 
(2) Consequences of Agency  
An agent has implied authority to perform those actions required to execute the agency agreement65 
but as there are likely to be no contractual terms for AE, all the terms will be implied.66  If it can be 
implied that the employer acts as an agent does this mean that particular standards would need to be 
adhered to in choosing the provider, scheme and making decisions about changes in future? In 
addition to fiduciary duties, agents also owe separate non-fiduciary duties which may be just as 
significant as the fiduciary duties67 namely; the duty to follow instructions; to exercise skill and care; 
duty not to delegate and duty to account. In English law the fiduciary duties may give rise to a claim 
in equity but the lack of equitable remedies in Scotland makes the distinction less important.68 For 
AE, the employee cannot give instructions to the employer as the employer is required to implement 
AE under statutory obligations. For non-gratuitous agency, such as this, the agent must “act with that 
diligence and discretion which a man of prudence uses in his affairs.69”  The employer does not act 
here as a professional agent but must demonstrate such diligence and discretion in actions.  
Consequently, it could be argued that employers must demonstrate that they acted with care in making 
choices about pension provider, selecting pension plans and benefits and administering the 
arrangement. The employer may decide not to spend money on advice and pick any provider or 
scheme that comes to hand without any thought. If the employer were making a similar decision for 
                                                            
61 D DeMott n60 at 12 
62 Batt Cables Plc v Spencer Business Parks Ltd (2010) S.L.T 860 at 866 
63 Batt Cables n62, McWilliam v Norton Finance [2015] EWCA Civ 186 
64 McWilliam n63 at 40-41 
65 JM & JH Robertson v Beatson, McLeod & Company Ltd (1908) SC 921 
66 L Macgregor (2013) n55 at 84, 88-93 
67 L Macgregor n55 at 160 
68 L Macgregor n55 at 30 
69 J Erskine An Institute of the Law of Scotland III (1695-1768) at 3, 37 
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itself more care might be exercised. Failure to exercise the same care when choosing an AE plan 
could then be a breach of the agent’s standard of care toward the principal as implied in the agency 
contract. The cost of obtaining advice on the continuing compliance with AE might also prevent an 
employer changing scheme or provider even if the existing scheme offers poor value compared to 
other products. In the employment relationship the employer has a legitimate interest in considering 
its business needs as well as the needs of the employee and this may prevent a finding that the 
employer acts as an agent in relation to AE.  In an agency relationship, the fiduciary duties and non-
fiduciary duties of care might assist the employee in claiming for loss arising from poor decisions by 
the employer as his agent. The facts and circumstances of the agency relationship can limit the scope 
of obligations; and agents have long been recognised as acting for single transactions or as special 
agents in Scotland, which further restricts fiduciary and non-fiduciary obligations.70 Courts have 
imposed fiduciary duties in ad hoc relationships to deal with the agency problem (failure to 
contractually anticipate all the obligations and opportunism in asymmetrical relationships) using 
concepts such as influence, trust and confidence and superiority to justify the inference. 71 
In the case of the employer acting to contract with a provider for the employee, the fact that the 
employer also holds the employees’ assets (deductions from salary as contributions) may be 
significant. The deductions remain the employee’s money but are dealt with by the employer 
(possibly as agent). Where the money is deducted and paid into an occupational pension scheme then 
this is held in trust for the beneficiaries of the scheme and the funds are entirely separate from both 
employer’s and employee’s funds. However, where a personal pension contract is used, the funds are 
paid over to the product provider and are held as assets in a policy in the name of the employee. The 
deductions and payment process are regulated by the AE legislation and require timeous payment and 
accounting to the employee but it is the employer who is responsible for ensuring calculations are 
correct and making the salary deductions and transfers.  
Agents are also obliged to impart knowledge to the principal so information given to the employer by 
the provider should be passed on.72 In AE the product provider is often contracted by the employer to 
provide the employees with information and support in relation to AE and it is not clear what role the 
provider takes on as they are party to contracts with both the employer and the employee. Most 
providers will offer strict standard terms excluding any liability as an agent or otherwise. 
Many indicators of agency are present in AE with the employer enjoying superiority in the 
relationship, the employee reposing trust in the employer and the employer being ceded power to 
manage the employees’ money and select a pension provider and plan. However, the difficulty in 
                                                            
70 Sao Paolo Alpargatas SA v Standard Chartered Bank (1985) S.L.T. 433 at 436 
71 R Sitkoff “An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law” in Gold n11 197-208 at 200 
72 D DeMott “The Lawyer as Agent” (1998-1999) 67 Fordham LR  301-326 at 307 
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identifying the terms of the agreement and the fact that the undertakings arise from statutory 
obligations, rather than consent, may go against a finding that the employer acts as an agent in this 
regard.  It might be difficult to demonstrate that the employer has chosen to undertake its duties but 
this is not fatal to any claim. The facts surrounding the AE relationship look like a case of agency 
giving rise to fiduciary and non-fiduciary obligations owed by the employer to its employees. 
However, it is not sufficiently clear to say with certainty that a legal remedy exists under this head and 
clarification on the extent of employer’s responsibilities is needed. 
D. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
Even if there is no fiduciary or agency obligation, the contract of employment may create additional 
contractual obligations in compliance with AE beyond the statutory minimum.  Employees derive 
benefits for occupational pension schemes from the contract of employment73 and so its terms are 
crucial to considering the extent of any obligations. However, employment contracts often say little 
about pensions, instead referring to member booklets and information given as part of the statutory 
AE information requirements.  The contract of employment is the control mechanism in the 
relationship74 and courts have been willing to use fiduciary obligations to correct imbalances and 
abuse of power, 75 although the relationship as a whole is unlikely to be fiduciary in nature. 
Employers may be obliged to monitor its pension plan as part of the mutual trust and confidence 
obligation but this is unlikely to require monitoring the suitability of investments in contract based 
schemes.76 This section considers whether the contract of employment requires the employer to 
execute its obligations under AE in a particular way to ensure that the employees’ interests are 
paramount. Imperial77 would suggest that this is unlikely. However, even without a general fiduciary 
obligation, there may be express or implied contractual obligations and these are discussed below.  
An employee owes a duty of loyalty to his employer but this does not equate to a fiduciary 
obligation,78 the contract of employment does not place the same duty of loyalty on the employer and 
the implied term of mutual trust and confidence does not perform exactly the same function.79 A fact 
                                                            
73 Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans 1990 1 WLR 1587 
74 V Sims n35 at 106 
75 Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher and Others [2011] 4 ALL ER 745 
76 Law Comm (2014) n6 at 156 
77 Imperial Group Pension Trust v Imperial Tobacco [1991] 1 W.L.R. 589 
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based approach might lead to findings of fiduciary obligations in some cases80 and the employer’s 
self-interest “is not inconsistent with more limited fiduciary duties.81”   
(1) Implied Terms 
Where there is no explicit undertaking in contract, terms may be implied where this would be what 
the reasonable person would think “the instrument means.82” The courts may imply terms which “can 
sometimes leap over their basic principle83” [in contract] to protect the worker. On this basis, implied 
terms may be read into the AE undertaking whereby the employer exercises discretion, such as the 
discretion to choose a pension provider or whether to change provider, or this might instead justify 
statutory change to correct the “inadequacy of the ordinary private law.84” For example, the House of 
Lords implied terms into junior doctors’ contracts of employment to provide that they would be 
advised of pension changes which they could not be expected to know about.85  However, the ratio on 
this point was very precise and great care was taken to prevent the widening of any employer 
obligations86 in general terms. This recognises the different bargaining positions of the parties and has 
been followed in subsequent decisions. 87 
The contract of employment contains a reciprocal duty of good faith which extends to powers 
exercised by the employer in relation to the pension scheme.88 Good faith is a distinct and differing 
obligation from a fiduciary duty in that it will not usually require one party to place another party’s 
interests above its own interests and the intention in a course of action is irrelevant.89 In the Imperial 
case, the company had a clear interest in the operation of the scheme, as it would bear excess costs, 
and so a fiduciary obligation could not be implied as that would require the employer to consider only 
the members’ interests.90 However, an implied obligation of good faith could be read into the contract 
to apply to “The exercise of his rights and powers under a pension scheme as they do to the other 
rights and powers of the employer.91”  
                                                            
80 J Murray n11 at 351 
81 J Murray n11 at 348 
82 Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd (PC) (2009) 1 WLR 1988-1998 at 1993 approved in PDPF GP 
Ltd v Santander UK Plc (2015) WLR 1839062 and Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services 
(SC(E)), [2015] 2 WLR 1843 at 1852 
83 Davies & Freedland “Employees, Workers, and the autonomy of labour law” in Legal Regulation of the 
Employment Relation (2000) Davies et al at 276 
84 H Collins “Justifications and techniques of legal regulation of the employment relation” in Davies et al n83 at 
4 
85 Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board (1991) ICR, 771 
86 Scally n85 at 781 
87 Pensions Ombudsman case (April 2013)  (PO-680) Major R Farrimond 
88 Imperial n77 at 589 
89 L Macgregor (2013) n55 at 124 
90 Imperial n77 at 597 
91 Imperial n77 at 597 
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So whilst the employer has the right to consider its own financial interests, the implied obligation of 
good faith ensures that decisions must not be undertaken in a way which undermines trust and 
confidence.92 If the employer is considered to be an agent of the employee, the duties are so 
comprehensive that an additional duty to act in good faith is unnecessary. 93 However, if there is no 
agency then it is necessary to consider the extent of any good faith obligations arising under the 
contract of employment. The discretion to choose or change provider and set contribution levels come 
under this umbrella of employer discretion to be exercised in good faith.  
(a) Mutual Trust and Confidence 
Trust and confidence has been considered in relation to the provision of information to 
employees/members and can cause difficulties. The narrow provisions of Scally have not been 
widened and the onus remains with employees to ensure information is considered with no obligation 
on employers to ensure it is read or to warn employees of consequences of actions. 94 If the 
relationship was categorised as fiduciary then a positive obligation by the employer to disclose any 
negative consequences from the proposed action would exist. There is a close connection between 
fiduciary obligations and the implied term of trust and confidence but trust and confidence has a 
different and distinct meaning. Namely, that the parties do not conduct themselves in a way which is 
likely to destroy the relationship of trust and confidence between them.95 The purpose of the implied 
term is to facilitate the proper functioning of the contract and protect the employment relationship. 
This recognises that the employment relationship is distinct from commercial relations and operates to 
prevent exploitation of workers96 and it is particularly important to guard against abuse in the exercise 
of discretionary powers by the employer.97 The employer’s motives are irrelevant.98 
“What is significant is the impact of the employer’s behaviour on the employee rather than what the 
employer intended.”99 
The duty of trust and confidence has been used by the courts to compel employers “to conduct 
themselves in a proactive manner by imposing a standard of care.100” Scally is authority for the 
principle that the employer is under no duty to exercise reasonable care in respect of the economic 
well-being of employees, but contrasts with the Visa case101 from which it appears that a similar 
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factual situation might result in a successful claim “for recovery of economic loss for a failure of the 
employer to inform based on a repudiatory breach of the duty of trust and confidence.102” Here the 
breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence occurred when the employer failed to advise the 
employee about a post that she thought would suit her.  
The question here is whether a lack of care in the selection of provider or fund could allow recovery 
for economic loss based on a breach of the trust and confidence obligation. The law may be willing to 
supply omissions in the employment contract to an extent not seen in other areas of contract103 and so 
the courts may imply this or it might require to be amended by further AE legislation. The implied 
obligation of mutual trust and confidence may be constrained by specific contractual provisions or 
statute and, where this concerns a discretionary power exercised by the employer, may also be subject 
to the implied duty to take reasonable care.104  
The court in Johnson105 held that the growth of the use of the implied obligation should be restricted 
to operate within legislative policy. Brodie calls for consideration of this dual regulation106 and 
highlights the reluctance of courts to provide a remedy in tort where one has been laid down by 
statute.107 Brodie finds that there is tension between this restraint and the Scally case in which it was 
held that the failure to provide information gave rise to a breach of contract. However, part of the 
Scally claim failed on the basis that statute already provided for a remedy of failing to provide written 
particulars. Brodie asks “If the intention of Parliament was to deny a remedy in tort, why allow one in 
contract?108”  For AE, enforcement is largely reserved to the Pensions Regulator but the legislation 
does not deal with form or method of implementation, other than providing minimum scheme 
requirements and technical failings.  One can conclude that form of implementation is unspecified 
avoiding the dual regulation issue. The implied term may also be restricted by contract and it is also 
possible that even negligent acts will not constitute a breach of the implied term if it does not 
seriously undermine trust and confidence109 although they may constitute a breach of the implied term 
to exercise reasonable care.  It is not clear whether poor decisions relating to choice of provider, fund 
or switching could ever undermine trust and confidence to the extent required to establish breach of 
mutual trust and confidence although it might be easier to establish a breach of the exercise of 
reasonable care.  
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(b) Good Faith 
A court should not impose its view of what is fair where the documentation is extensive and detailed 
but the general expansion of the implied term of good faith continued in Scotland 110 although “there 
is no general rule that a commercial contract requires to be fair.111” However, where the contract in 
question is a relational one,112 like a contract of employment, then the argument in favour of a general 
implied term requiring good faith is stronger. It may require the employer to objectively justify any 
exercise of discretion 113 and exercise “in accordance with the implied obligation of trust and 
confidence.114”   
The court is not entitled to substitute its own view of what a reasonable decision is but instead 
considers the rationality of the decision made and whether the process is flawed by failure to consider 
relevant facts or consideration of irrelevant ones.115 On this basis, the employer choosing a scheme for 
AE must exercise the decision in a way that demonstrates that the process is rational and is in keeping 
with the obligation of trust and confidence. The bystander might ask whether the employer has a duty 
under the contract of employment to take care in choosing the provider. The parties may agree as they 
had assumed this was the case. However, the parties may not intend a special level of care to be taken 
and the employer might argue that only the minimum required to comply with the AE legislation 
would be included in the contract. Whilst the employer has a right to consider its own interests in 
making these decisions, the factors such as trust, asymmetries of power and information, reliance and 
expectation will all be evidence of the expectations of the employee as a party to the contract. The 
increasing significance of good faith in contractual performance of employment contracts may require 
the employer to demonstrate that discretionary powers were exercised rationally. 116 
(c)  Duty to Advise 
Under AE there are specific information requirements requiring employers to give workers certain 
key information.117 The employer retains responsibility for providing this information, even if it 
contracts with a pension provider to provide the information,118 and this could create some tensions. 
The standard employer/provider contract may exclude the pension provider’s liability for loss arising 
from its failures in this regard leaving the employer responsible to the regulator and potentially in 
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respect of civil claims by employees. Technical failures to comply with the AE legislation will be 
enforced by the Pensions Regulator, but in requiring the employer to provide information to 
employees this could place the employer in the position of being seen to offer advice, depending on 
the nature of information given. This would explain the fear and reluctance of employers to discuss 
pension benefits beyond the basic information given.119 If the employer tries to provide a better 
quality scheme which allows the employee access to its own financial advisor this might be construed 
as giving advice which could leave it open to claims in delict/tort. 
Claims might arise on the basis of poor information about choices, contributions or in respect of the 
employer’s decisions relating to the provider itself. It seems unlikely that a contractual claim in 
respect of failure to provide the statutory required information would be successful as that would fall 
within the remit of the Pensions Regulator under AE. However, knowledge of others is not an 
objective test and, if a positive finding of fiduciary duties is made, the employer would have to 
consider regularly whether the form and content of information given was enough for the principal to 
make decisions. The Deputy Pensions Ombudsman recently120 considered accuracy of information 
and whether requests were for advice or information.  Referring the member to an intranet site without 
further guidance was deemed inadequate and, as she had relied on inaccurate information, she was to 
be reinstated in the pension scheme.  This determination does not sit comfortably with Scally as the 
member had the information she needed but it highlights the difficulties of balancing providing 
adequate information and providing advice. 
Other determinations found no general duty on an employer to provide information or advice to 
employees to prevent economic loss, emphasising the specialist nature of advice. 121  The employer 
had not assumed any responsibility to provide advice and liability in tort, under a duty of care, could 
only succeed where there was an express or implied contractual duty to provide advice. Following 
Scally, any claim in tort is bound to fail if there is no contractual obligation to advise.  
My empirical research122 demonstrates that employers are cautious about providing information that 
might be construed as advice which results in more generic information being provided. Employees 
were unsure about whether advice or information was provided. The question of information versus 
advice was considered recently123 where the pursuers argued that bank employees had given advice in 
relation to an interest swap agreement. The contractual basis of the agreement made it clear that the 
bank was not providing advice and correspondence advised the individuals to seek their own 
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professional financial advice. The contractual terms did not set up an advisor/client relationship, even 
if the clients treated it as advisory and relied on it this. Reliance was not reasonable in the face of the 
contractual agreement.124 The fact that the parties had signed the agreement meant they were bound 
by its terms even if they had not read them. Product providers usually exclude such liability by 
specifying that only information, not advice, is provided.   
The employment contract is likely to be silent on the issue and it will be a matter of fact to determine 
if the information given by an employer makes it clear that the relationship is not advisory or whether 
it might be reasonable for employees to rely on the information as advice. Lack of specification of the 
standards to be followed by the employer in implementing AE may also to be fatal to any claim based 
on the existence of agreement between the parties.  
(d) Duty to Avoid Economic Loss 
Economic loss was considered recently where advice was sought and given with assurances and 
reliance on the advice resulted in loss.125 Mr Lennon could not sue for breach of contract as he was a 
member of the police force and had no contract of employment. Instead he sued in tort in respect of 
economic loss arising from a breach of duty of care arising from an assumption of responsibility by a 
personnel officer for a pension transfer. Although the personnel officer was not a professional advisor, 
she had special knowledge and led Mr Lennon to believe that he could rely on her which was 
sufficient to attract the duty to give advice.126 The duty of care arises from an express assumption of 
liability for a particular matter, which was relied upon.127  
The implied term to prevent economic loss where there is no undertaking of advice, is unlikely to be 
inferred contractually on the basis that it is too significant an extension of the existing law and 
“impose an unfair and unreasonable burden on employers.128” This public policy constraint of 
unreasonable burden on employers may also prevent a finding that employers are obliged to do 
anything other than the AE minimum. Where the employer assumes responsibility for the giving of 
financial advice then it is under a duty to take reasonable care in the giving of advice. However, that it 
is quite different to imply that the employer is obliged to provide such advice or to generally 
safeguard the employee’s well-being. With the simplification of schemes to reduce costs, advice may 
not be available in future. Employees may ask more questions of the employer but these will go 
unanswered as employers and HR representatives are now very wary of answering questions which 
might be construed as advice. This means that whilst there may be a remedy for poor advice, 
employers may choose not to respond to questions and instead refer employees to the product 
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provider. The product provider may also disclaim any responsibility to answer questions or advise 
(particularly at the pre-contract stage) and this leaves the employee with an information gap, the 
effects of which are exacerbated by AE.  It was considered unnecessary to include provision for 
financial advice in AE but it is clear that in failing to obtain advice some individuals will suffer as a 
consequence of the regime. Employees would have to understand this and then pay for advice which 
acts as a barrier to understanding and engagement and can also be described as a further cost of the 
regime.  
(2) AE Compliance  
The PA 2008129 sets out the compliance provisions for AE and reserves jurisdiction on compliance 
matters to the Pensions Regulator but provides130 that nothing in this chapter “affects any right of 
action arising apart from these provisions.131”  These are the basic technical requirements relating to 
implementation of AE. The question remains whether an employer could meet the basic statutory 
requirements in terms of compliance and scheme quality and nevertheless be open to a claim under 
obligations owed as fiduciaries, agents or under implied contractual obligations. This might arise 
because of the lack of care taken in choosing a scheme, decision making process when having to 
change scheme to meet new quality standards or in choosing a provider. The Pensions Regulator may 
investigate breaches of compliance by employers and issue enforcement notices or require payment of 
contributions. Whilst enforcement of the basic implementation of AE is reserved to the Pensions 
Regulator, questions which relate more generally to the contract of employment or relationships may 
still be considered under private law. In considering whether the mutual trust obligation is breached 
by an employer being careless in discretionary decisions it is important to remember that the employer 
has a legitimate business interest in implementing AE in a cost effective way for its business. The 
Pensions Ombudsman may also be asked to consider such issues but, at present, it is unclear if a 
remedy would exist in the circumstances described above.  
The information requirements may put employers in a difficult position if they do not get the correct 
balance between giving enough information to inform employees without giving employees the 
impression that they have undertaken to provide advice. Brodie talks of the importance of fair 
procedure in relation to such matters as pay reviews and this may also apply to decisions made in 
relation to AE. Even if the results could have been better for employees if alternate decisions were 
made, if the employer can demonstrate a fair process for the decisions made then it will be less likely 
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to breach the obligation.132 As a minimum, I would argue that employers should be able to 
demonstrate that a fair process has been followed when making discretionary decisions under AE. 
E. DUTIES OWED BY THE PENSION PROVIDER OR ADVISORS 
 
The position in relation to contract based pensions is complicated and depends on factual 
circumstances and documentation. Whilst providers may influence the interests of members, this in 
itself is insufficient to create a fiduciary obligation owed by the provider and contractual terms which 
support member’s expectations are required, as discussed above.133 There are difficulties in applying 
this contractual model in AE as it is the employer which engages with the provider at the pre-contract 
stage to establish the employee’s personal pension contract with the provider. After enrolment, the 
employee has a personal pension policy with the provider and can enforce its terms, change 
contributions or funds.  Whether fiduciary duties are owed to the employee depends on whether 
advice is given.134  Often the provider is not involved in the advisory process at all and an independent 
advisor is employed to find a scheme for the employer. The advisor will be contracted to provide 
advice to the employer on a suitable scheme which complies with AE within particular parameters of 
cost or quality as directed by the employer. In this situation the advisor may owe duties to the 
employer which are contractual and fiduciary but is unlikely to owe these to the employee unless the 
provider has engaged in providing direct advice to employees. Duties to employees are limited to 
those contained in the personal pension policy. 
My empirical research135 demonstrates that employees may be unsure about the role of the advisor. If 
advice is offered from a professional advisor then a duty of care under the law of delict may exist136 
but this requires the pursuer to demonstrate that there is an industry practice, that this has not been 
applied in this case and that the course taken is one which no professional of ordinary skill would 
have taken. The FCA Conduct of Investment Business Handbook (COBS) might be used to support 
such a claim.137  However, the employee would have to demonstrate that the advisor owed him a duty 
which was breached. This would be difficult as the employee would need to demonstrate that the 
advisor had assumed responsibility for the employee without any contractual undertakings or special 
relationship.138 In AE, where information is given it will usually include a disclaimer to the effect that 
the advisor is only offering information which would go against any suggestion that the advisor 
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assumed responsibility. Even if responsibility is proved then the employee would still need to 
demonstrate that the breach of duty caused the loss alleged.   
It may also be the case that, where the claimant is someone other than the party being given direct 
advice, the middle party may be responsible for negligent advice. For example, the employer may be 
liable if it passes on advice to the employee that it has received from its own advisor but courts are 
reluctant to impose such duties139 and would likely approach fiduciary duties in the same way. 
Information given directly to employees by advisors is governed by the FCA rules.140 However, the 
UK explicitly provides a remedy for breaches suffered by private persons under the Financial Services 
and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000.141  It has been argued that COBS will form strong evidence of 
required standards and that private law duties of agency and delict will be breached where there is a 
failure to comply with COBS prior to conclusion of a contract.142 The analogy with the AE scenario is 
that the pension provider or advisor may owe obligations under COBS to the employees in the period 
prior to conclusion of the contract effecting the personal pension.   
F. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has considered whether private law provides an adequate remedy for those who suffer loss 
as a consequence of the AE regime. Pension changes may be accompanied by complex information 
and loss or detriment may arise from the provision of information and advice and the exercise of 
employer discretion under AE. If employers are found to owe particular standards of care when 
exercising discretionary decisions under AE, this might improve both the default positions and the 
level of engagement of employees. The asymmetric information and power in the AE relationship 
may result in a finding that the employer acts as a fiduciary or agent in respect of the AE decisions it 
makes for the employee. If pension providers and advisors engage with employees during this process 
they may also owe duties to the employees. Vulnerability, exercise of discretion, management of 
affairs by one party, status of the parties and contractual provisions may all indicate the existence of a 
fiduciary obligation. Whilst the whole employer/employee relationship is unlikely to be categorised as 
fiduciary, some aspects may be. The employment contract is likely to be silent on much of AE, but 
terms may be implied to infer duties. Even if there is no finding of fiduciary duties, the employer may 
act as an agent for the employee in arranging his AE pension which would require the employer to 
demonstrate that care was taken in exercising discretionary decisions; such as choice of provider, 
default funds and plan structure.  
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The contract of employment may also require the employer to fulfil its AE duties to a particular 
standard. The implied duties of mutual trust and confidence and good faith may impose a standard of 
care in respect of AE compliance. There is no obligation on the employer to provide advice to 
employees but where this is proffered then this may prove actionable in delict where there is a failure 
in the duty of care in providing that advice. Employees may also have a direct right of action against 
the pension provider or professional advisors if it can be established that they failed to comply with 
the FCA handbook in some way in their dealings with the employee. 
Where a policy produces negative effects then there should be a means of redress, either by the courts, 
as outlined here, or by extension of the AE regulations by Pensions Regulator guidance or further 
statutory codification. Whilst it may be possible to argue that these duties are present and create 
obligations, it is not clear and the costs involved in bringing such claims may also be prohibitive. 
Further statutory amendment to the AE legislation, outlining the extent of duties and processes in the 
implementation of AE, would provide clarity and certainty. Without such clarification it is possible 
that, in twenty years’ time as people start to draw these benefits, claims may emerge which are 
problematic for employers and employees alike.  
 
 
